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The Case Beyond Time
By Lyman Johnson* and David Millon**

INTRODUCTION
The Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Paramount Communications,Inc.

v. Time, Inc.' treats several important questions that arise in connection with
hostile corporate takeovers. At the same time, it leaves three critical issues
unanswered. In this article, we first briefly describe what the Time decision did,
comparing Chancellor William Allen's somewhat discursive Chancery Court
opinion with the more peremptory ruling of the Supreme Court. Next, we
identify three unarticulated but potentially far-reaching implications of both the
Supreme Court's and Chancellor Allen's reasoning that threaten to destabilize
seemingly settled doctrine governing the conduct of target company management.

WHAT THE TIME CASE DID
Unlike many of Delaware's corporate takeover decisions, Time did not
involve a request to enjoin a lock-up option or to compel redemption of a poison
pill. Instead, Paramount and two groups of Time shareholders sought to block
Time's purchase of Warner stock at $70 per share pursuant to a cash tender
offer. Originally, and long before Paramount's appearance on the scene, Time
and Warner had agreed to a stock-for-stock merger of the two companies.' The
selection of Warner as a merger partner had taken a long time and occurred
only after the Time board of directors had carefully considered how such a
merger would serve the company's long-term expansion strategy while preserving the zealously guarded "Time Culture." In Chancellor Allen's words, "[tihis
culture appears in part to be pride in the history of the firm-notably Time
*Mr. Johnson is an Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
B.A., 1973, Carleton College; J.D., 1978, University of Minnesota.

"Mr. Millon is an Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
B.A., 1975, M.A. 1976, Ohio State University; M.A. 1978, Ph.D. 1982, Cornell University; J.D.
1983, Harvard Law School.
1. [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,938 (Del. Feb. 26, 1990).

2. More specifically, Warner was to be merged into a wholly-owned subsidiary of Time with
Warner to be the surviving corporation. Thereafter, Warner's common stock would be converted
into Time stock at the agreed-upon ratio and the name of Time would be changed to Time-Warner,

Inc. Id. at 95,205.
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magazine and its role in American life-and in part a managerial philosophy
and distinctive structure that is intended to protect journalistic integrity from
pressures from the business side of the enterprise." 3
Both companies had scheduled special shareholder meetings to vote on the
proposed merger transaction.' Shortly before the meetings, however, and after
proxy materials had been mailed to stockholders, Paramount made an all-cash,
all-shares tender offer for Time's stock at a price of $175 per share. Time's
board of directors met several times to discuss Paramount's offer but regarded it
as inadequate and inferior to the proposed merger with Warner. Of special
concern to the board was its belief that Paramount's bid threatened Time's
control of its destiny and its unique "Time Culture." Therefore, it refused to
discuss the offer with Paramount. Nonetheless, while the Time board remained
committed to a consolidation with Warner, it feared that Time shareholders
would reject the proposed merger in light of the Paramount offer. Thus, Time
and Warner abandoned the merger agreement and, instead, agreed that Time
would make a cash and securities tender offer for Warner stock.'
The effect of recasting the transaction was twofold. First, acquisition by
tender offer, unlike a merger, does not require shareholder approval. Thus,
Time's shareholders were deprived of the opportunity to vote "no" on the
proposed merger, a vote which, in effect, would amount to a "yes" vote on the
Paramount offer. Second, Time's board conceded that Time's stock would,
immediately after the acquisition of Warner, trade at a price somewhere in a
range of $106-$188. When Paramount raised its "fully negotiable" offer to
$200-an offer the Time board also rejected-Time's advisors predicted that,
over the longer term, the stock would appreciate and end up being worth a great
deal more than $200. Nevertheless, the decision of Time's board to purchase
Warner denied Time's shareholders a choice between a lot of immediate, sure
money and a less certain but conceivably much greater return later. Both Time
shareholders and Paramount sued to enjoin Time's tender offer.

Circumventing the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
Chancellor Allen begins his analysis in Time by framing the ultimate legal
issue as the question of who, between shareholders and management, ought to
3. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,514 at 93,267 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989).

4. Although Delaware law did not require a vote by Time shareholders, the rules of the New
York Stock Exchange required that Time's shareholders approve the issuance of shares to effectuate
the merger. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,938 at 95,205.
5. It was agreed that Time would make an all-cash offer for 51% of Warner's outstanding
common stock at a price of $70 per share. The remaining 49% of common stock would be purchased
later for a combination of cash and securities worth $70 per share. Id. at 95,206. Although the
restructured transaction meant that, unlike the original merger proposal, Time would incur several
billion dollars of indebtedness, the Supreme Court rebuffed Paramount's argument that such large

debt rendered the board's decision unreasonable under Unocal's two-step analysis. See Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH)

94,938 at 95,211. See also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.

1985).
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decide whether to proceed with the Warner acquisition and thereby prefer
lower current share value for the sake of possibly higher future share value.
This choice would not exist, or would be of no consequence, were there no
distinction between the current value of Paramount's offer and the claimed
longer-term value of Time stock. Thus, Chancellor Allen's first task was to
address the legal significance of that distinction. How could the Time board
credibly claim that its plan would yield the shareholders value exceeding
Paramount's seemingly much higher offer? Answering that question required
Chancellor Allen to venture forth into the abstruse world of financial economics
and its central tenet of efficient capital markets.
We offer no elaborate explication, critique, or defense of the efficient capital
market hypothesis here.6 The hypothesis actually has three dimensions or forms
-weak, semi-strong, and strong. Although Chancellor Allen does not make it
clear, he takes up the legal status of the semi-strong form. Briefly, the semistrong form asserts that market prices of securities react quickly and in an
unbiased fashion to publicly available information. Chancellor Allen does not
attempt to refute the validity of this proposition about share price behavior.
Indeed, he states that it "may be correct." 7 Further, he allows that perhaps
"wise social policy and sound business decisions ought to be premised upon the
assumptions that underlie that view."" But, granting that, Chancellor Allen does
not take it as his job to pass on the soundness of this tenet. He sees his task as
the more modest one of deciding whether "the common law of directors' duties
elevate[s] the theory of a single, efficient capital market to the dignity of a sacred
text." 9 Put that way, Chancellor Allen refuses to compel target company
directors to subscribe to the theory of efficient capital markets when formulating
business and takeover strategy. Directors are thus free to operate on the view
that a capital market valuation of the target company is, at any given time,
"wrong."o
The basis for liberating management from captivity to capital market valuation of corporate securities is simple. As insiders, corporate directors possess
more information about the corporation's current and future circumstances than
anybody else." Inasmuch as directors have no standing duty to disclose all
corporate information to which they have access, absent disclosure or a leak, the
public market cannot have digested that information. Thus, the hypothesis of
efficient capital markets has not been rejected so much as its predicate rendered
inoperative: all information about a corporation is not publicly available. But,
Chancellor Allen does not stop there. He goes further and suggests that even
with dissemination of all available information, the directors might rationally
6. For a useful collection of materials on the efficient capital market hypothesis, see R.
Hamilton, Corporate Finance 252-95 (2d ed. 1989).
7. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 at 93,277.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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conclude that a market's reaction will still "undervalue the stock.' 1 2 Here, he
comes close to repudiating the theory.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court neither accepts nor rejects the efficient
capital market hypothesis as such.' 3 Believing it "unwise to place undue
emphasis upon long-term versus short-term corporate strategy," 1 4 the Court
instead addresses a more basic and conventional question: to whom has Delaware corporate law assigned the power to make fundamental decisions about
corporate affairs? Looking first to the corporate statute, the Court construes the
duty of a board of directors to manage the business and affairs of a corporation
pursuant to section 141(a) as including a "conferred authority to set a corporate
course of action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability."15 In other words, the theoretical debate over possible disparities in longterm and short-term share values is "largely irrelevant '1 6 to the law because the
Delaware legislature, according to the Court, has empowered corporate boards
to select the time horizon over which corporate goals will be pursued. Thus,
even if there were an admitted difference between long-term and short-term
share values, it is of no consequence to bidder and target company shareholders
because only incumbent management has the legal stature to choose between the
two.

Turning from statutory interpretation to the common law of directors'
fiduciary duties, the Court similarly states that, except for the "limited set of
circumstances as defined under Revlon,"" a target board is not "under any per
se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a
takeover."' Thus, common law joins statutory law in refusing to pre-ordain a
time frame within which directors must pursue corporate goals or within which
courts are constrained to evaluate director success. Instead, both sources of law
consciously leave that baseline question to the informed discretion of directors.
The portion of the opinion in which the Supreme Court deals with this
critical issue is distressingly terse and almost dismissive. Moreover, its troubling
implications for the ability of either shareholders or the judiciary to hold
corporate management accountable for its performance are either unseen by the
Court or simply unacknowledged. For example, although the Court describes a
board's responsibility to "charter a course for a corporation which is in its best
interests,"" no benchmark for gauging that interest is provided. It is not even
clear, by the Court's reasoning, that directors are required to maximize profit12. Id.
13. The Court does say, however, that it "tacitly accept[s] the Chancellor's conclusion that it is
not a breach of faith for directors to determine that the present stock market price is not
representative of true value .. " Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,938 at 95,207 n.12.
14. Id. at 95,207.
15. Id. (emphasis added).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 95,208. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
18. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,938 at 95,208.
19. Id. at 95,207.
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ability-any more than shareholder wealth-as the equivalent of "best interest." The Court may presume the pursuit of that financial goal as a basic
corporate law norm, but it recites no authority for so constraining director
discretion. Furthermore, as a mechanism for disciplining a board that fails to
achieve its own professed goals for the corporation, takeovers are defanged.
Shareholders can take no meaningful collective actions in the capital marketssuch as tendering their stock to the hostile bidder-to express displeasure with
management behavior because management can justify a host of formidable
defensive measures as essential to the realization of yet a new and ever-shifting
investment horizon.
In this scenario it simply wouldn't matter that shareholders are presented
with a "short-term" opportunity-that is, a hostile bid-to gain value in excess
of what they believe can be achieved longer term. In the name of pursuing the
"corporation's best interests," directors can act to preclude shareholders from
exercising such a choice. And if no choice can be made, eventually bidders will
no longer make such opportunities available.
Indeed, it seems clear that the Supreme Court's brief treatment of the "shortterm/long-term" issue is intended to lay the conceptual groundwork for the very
end of its opinion, where the Court rejects the plaintiffs' claim that Time's
restructuring of the Time-Warner transaction was not "reasonable" under
Unocal's second step because it precluded shareholders from receiving a control
premium. The Court emphasizes that such a "right" does not exist in the
abstract, but only at the discretion of the board as deemed consistent with the
attainment of corporate goals.20 Such a conclusion would not have been possible
without first decisively locating authority over the totality of corporate affairsincluding the formulation of corporate goals-with directors rather than shareholders.
In quite different ways, then, both Chancellor Allen's opinion and the
Supreme Court's deal a serious setback to efforts to deploy the efficient capital
market hypothesis as a "scientific" basis for tying management's hands in
takeover contests. Thus, as the intellectual underpinning of the more general
project to deregulate capital markets, the efficient capital market hypothesis
continues to enjoy only spotty success.21

20. Id. at 95,211.
21. For a description of how the efficient capital market hypothesis has been used as a
justification for advocating deregulation of national capital markets and a response to that argument,
see Coffee, Market Failureand the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 Va. L.
Rev. 717 (1984). The United States Supreme Court appears to have embraced the notion of efficient
capital markets and its corollary, the fraud-on-the-market theory, in the context of claims under
SEC rule 10b-5, while leaving states free to reject the concept in their state antitakeover legislation.
Compare Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) with CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.
481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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Containing the Revlon Auction Mandate
Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.22 held that when target
company directors conclude that a break-up sale of the company is "inevitable,"
they are transformed into auctioneers whose sole function is to secure top
current dollar for shareholders. Many postRevlon decisions in Delaware have
grappled with the question of what events do or do not trigger the Revlon
auction mandate.2 3 In Time, the shareholder plaintiffs argued that Time had
entered the Revlon mode because the proposed merger with Warner represented
a transfer of control. The basis for that claim was two-fold: first, the exchange
ratio in the original transaction would have resulted in Warner shareholders
owning approximately 62% of the stock of the combined company; second, the
subjective intent of Time's directors as evidenced by statements that the market
might perceive the transaction as a sale and the adoption of defensive measures
was construed as evidence that they believed the Revlon threshold had been
crossed.24
While Chancellor Allen draws on the recent Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. decision to affirm that the Revlon posture could be assumed
involuntarily and without the express subjective intention of doing so, he
emphasizes that the Revlon threshold and its corresponding duty to maximize
current share value is crossed only when a corporate transaction represents a
"change in corporate control."2 He concludes that the initial merger agreement
between Time and Warner did not result in a change in control because even
though 62% of Time's shares would come to be held by Warner shareholders,
the stock would, as before, be widely dispersed among public shareholders in a
"large, fluid, changeable, and changing market."26 Not being a change of control
transaction, Time was not in the Revlon mode. Again, as with the efficient
capital market hypothesis issue, the predicate for a supposedly operative principle was found not to exist.
Here, Chancellor Allen continues, as he did in City Capital Associates v.
Interco,27 to read Revlon's flash point narrowly and to regard that decision as
neither remarkable nor inconsistent with earlier Delaware corporate law.
Furthermore, since a board of directors standing outside the Revlon mode is
under no obligation to maximize current share value, but may instead operate
the corporation for "long run" profit maximization, Chancellor Allen stresses
that the board has no freestanding duty to conduct a Revlon auction. Thus,
Chancellor Allen pays his respects to the reasoning of Revlon but steadfastly
refuses to extend it.

22. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
23. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,401 at 92,599-600 n.35 (Del. May 3, 1989).
24. See Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,938 at 95,207-09.
25. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 at 93,279.
26. Id. at 93,280.
27. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988), appeal dismissed as moot, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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The Supreme Court holds that Chancellor Allen's findings of fact on the
Revlon claim were supported by the record and that his conclusion was correct

as a matter of law. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court prefers to reject the
shareholders' Revlon claim on what it describes as "broader grounds," 2 thereby
aiming to dispel the confusion caused by continuing uncertainty about Revlon's

scope.
In fact, the Supreme Court's "broader grounds" amount to an even narrower
reading of the Revlon mandate than that offered by Chancellor Allen. While the
Chancellor held that Revlon duties had not been triggered because there was no

"change in control," the Supreme Court required the inevitable dissolution or

break-up--not merely actions that might be interpreted as portending the sale

or transfer-of the corporate enterprise. As stated by the Supreme Court: "[w]e
premise our rejection of plaintiffs' Revlon claim on ... the absence of any
substantial evidence to conclude that Time's board, in negotiating with Warner,
made the dissolution or breakup of the corporate entity inevitable, as was the
case in Revlon." 29 It further stated: "[w]e decline to extend Revlon's application
to corporate transactions simply because they might be construed as putting a
30
corporation either 'in play' or 'up for sale'.
In effect, the Supreme Court holds that, as long as the "corporation's
continued existence"" a is not being abandoned by the board, no Revlon duties
attach. 2 As with the Court's discussion of the "long-term/short-term" issue, we
again see the emphasis on director duties to the corporateenterprise, rather than
more narrowly to shareholder interests. Duty to enterprise is paramount; only
when the enterprise's configuration is to be substantially diminished do shareholder interests assume primacy.
In this way, Revlon's emphasis on shareholder welfare can be seen as no
more than a variation on the basic Unocal analysis. Only when the corporation
qua corporation is to be broken up is the first prong of Unocal (with its
emphasis on danger to corporate policy and effectiveness) modified to reflect
Revlon's focus on shareholderwell-being. Unocal's predicate goal of safeguarding the corporate enterprise having been abandoned by directors in a dissolution
or break-up, the new goal in the Revlon mode is the maximization of shareholder wealth as achieved by an auction. In short, shareholders are a contingent
beneficiary of director duties; they lay claim only if the primary beneficiary (the
corporation) legally "predeceases" them.
Describing director duties under Unocal and Revlon in this way does not
completely reconcile the two modes of analysis. It remains to describe the
28. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
29. Id.
30. Id.

94,938 at 95,208.

31. Id.
32. Id.The Court's language is too broad for the point it wishes to make. What the Court means
is that if the "corporation's continued existence" is abandoned by a diminution such as a break-up
or dissolution, Revlon duties kick in. The corporation's "continued" existence is also altered, as in
Time itself, by decisions to augment the enterprise by acquisition or consolidation. Such alterations,
however, unlike those that diminish the enterprise, are deemed not to trigger Revlon duties.
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judicial function in all this. Here, Unocal's second step (the reasonableness of
the defensive measures in relation to the threat posed) conjoins Revlon to
Unocal. Under Unocal, defensive measures must be reasonable in relation to the
threat to the corporate enterprise, while Revlon mandates that an auction be
conducted in a manner reasonable in relation to the maximization of shareholder value."3 To put it succinctly, Revlon's facts reveal that Revlon's directors

failed the second step of the Unocal analysis.
While the somewhat uneasy relationship of Revlon and Unocal can be

harmonized in this way, what warrants emphasis about the Supreme Court's
Time opinion is that, absent the limiting circumstances of Revlon, Unocal's

focus is wholly on director duty to the continuing enterprise, not on satisfying
the desires or enhancing the well-being of shareholders. The net effect of both

the Chancery Court and Supreme Court opinions in Time, then, is to integrate
Revlon into the larger body of corporate law jurisprudence while, at the same
time, blunting its force by treating it as a "special" case.
Limiting Shareholder Choice
Having averted Revlon's auction mandate, Chancellor Allen still faced the
challenge of Interco and Grand Metropolitan PLC v. The Pillsbury Co. 4 and
their newly-minted emphasis on shareholder choice in resolving key takeover
issues. In both Interco and Pillsbury the target company boards were ordered to
redeem poison pills so that target company shareholders could choose between
the hostile bid and a company-sponsored restructuring alternative. In Time,
Chancellor Allen asserts that in both Interco and Pillsbury there was no threat
to the "corporation" as an enterprise, only a threat to shareholders. On this, he
is wrong. What he might mean is that in those cases target management
advanced no "corporate" interests for consideration separate and apart from
shareholder financial interests or that "corporate" interests simply have no force
in corporate law if they impair shareholder freedom to pick between financial
options generated by management after the onset of the hostile contest. Chancellor Allen also stresses that the financial alternatives in each of the Interco and
Pillsbury cases were "functionally equivalent" to one another.
In Time, by way of contrast, Chancellor Allen notes that Time's board, while
not unmindful of a takeover threat, had planned the original Warner merger
well in advance of Paramount's hostile offer.3" Thus, there were sound reasons
for believing the merger would serve the corporation's long-run profit maximizing goals and that it was not primarily motivated to retain control in incumbent
management. In other words, because Time's board could advance plausible,
33. The Supreme Court clearly seeks to square Revlon with Unocal in this fashion: "Within the
[Revlon] auction process, any action taken by the board must be reasonably related to the threat
posed or reasonable in relation to the advantage sought .... Thus, a Unocal analysis may be
appropriate when a corporation is in a Revlon situation ... ." Id. at 95,208 n.14.
34. 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
35. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 at 93,283.
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pre-existing (not "reactive") business enterprise reasons for the Warner deal, it
could preclude shareholders from choosing the Paramount offer.
In spite of that beguiling factual distinction, however, Chancellor Allen
appreciates that the trouble paid to shareholder choice in Interco and Pillsbury
compels him to address an elemental issue: why should Time shareholders be
prevented from choosing (or requiring management to choose on their behalf)
between an immediate $200 and an immediate $150, a choice many, perhaps
most, shareholders would exercise in favor of Paramount's higher offer of an
immediate $200?36 Chancellor Allen speaks to this fundamental issue at two
levels. First, he observes that shareholders themselves have no right to make that
choice.3 7 Under longstanding principles of Delaware corporate governance, they
simply have no say on whether the corporation is to pursue an acquisition of
Warner, even if the acquisition effectively precludes a decision to sell stock to
Paramount, a matter Chancellor Allen clearly acknowledges otherwise lies with
shareholders. Here, he points out an obvious fact about contemporary corporate
law: shareholders are passive bystanders, not active participants, in decisions
about corporate activity. As such, at least some "corporate" transactions can be
legitimately pursued without shareholder input even if they jeopardize shareholder stock disposition opportunities. Second, in these cases the board itself is
not obligated to "follow the wishes of the majority of shares."3 Carrying out its
statutory charge to oversee operation of the corporation, management simply is
not obligated to maximize short-term shareholder wealth. The board is free to
pursue its own business strategy and prefer the longterm over a shorter term
financial horizon. Thus, the well-being of shareholders is mediated through
management's control of the corporate enterprise and thereby rests entirely in
the hands of the board. With managerial skill and good judgment and with luck,
shareholders will prosper.3 9 Without, they will not.
The basic thrust of the Supreme Court's treatment of the shareholder choice
issue is much the same as Chancellor Allen's. The key difference is the Supreme
Court's effort to ground its reasoning on Unocal while also taking a jibe at the
Chancery Court decisions in Interco and Pillsbury.
The Supreme Court states that these two decisions, along with AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.,4" may have misled plaintiffs into
believing that an all-cash, all-shares bid falling within a range of values that a
reasonable shareholder might accept cannot constitute a "threat" under Unocal's first prong. The Supreme Court declares that this stemmed from a
misapprehension that a tender offer can pose only two kinds of threat: first, the
36. Plainly, Chancellor Allen was aware of shareholder preferences. Id. at 93,284 ("That many,

presumably most, shareholders would prefer the board to do otherwise than it has done does not...
afford a basis to interfere with the effectuation of the board's business judgment.").
37. Id. at 93,281.
38. Id. at 93,284.
39. Id. ("The value of a shareholder's investment, over time, rises or falls chiefly because of the
skill, judgment and perhaps luck-for it is present in all human affairs-of the management and
directors of the enterprise.")
40. 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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threat of coercion in a two-tier bid and, second, the threat of inadequatevalue in
an all-cash, all-shares bid. The Court rejects that "narrow and rigid construction" 41 of Unocal, but, in fairness to the Chancery Court and plaintiffs, the
Supreme Court itself bears a large measure of responsibility for the confusion.
The Court's continuing explanation of Unocal as having involved a threat to
shareholder interests rather than to the corporate enterprise to which the first
prong of Unocal's formulation makes explicit reference underlies this misunderstanding. Indeed, in the Time opinion itself, the Supreme Court describes
Unocal as follows: "Unocal involved a two-tier highly coercive tender offer. In
such a case, the threat is obvious: shareholders may be compelled to tender to
avoid being treated adversely in the second stage of the transaction.""
What the Court should have said about Unocal all along is what it more
successfully says about it in other parts of the Time opinion: Unocal is about
threats to the corporate enterprise, not shareholders (otherwise, Revlon's more
pointed focus would apply).4 Characterizing bids as coercive and inadequate is
to describe them in reference to shareholders; they are coercive and inadequate
to shareholders, so they are threats to shareholders, not the enterprise.

Later portions of the Time opinion seek to recapture the enterprise dimension
of Unocal that suffuses the Court's earlier discussion of Revlon and the "longterm/short-term" issue. The Court starts in this direction by describing Unocal
as a flexible analytical tool, not an "abstract standard"" or a "structured and
mechanistic procedure of appraisal."" The Court then underscores the array of
factors that directors rightly may consider when evaluating the threat posed by a
bid. Among these, as in Unocal, is the impact of a bid on constituencies other
than shareholders. Surely, if the focus was to be exclusively on coercion or
inadequate value, consideration of such interests would be completely inappropriate. Furthermore, to read Unocal as sanctioning a mathematical comparison
of the discounted present values of financial alternatives is to substitute a
judicial for a directorial business judgment. Doing so would draw judges into
the very thick of takeover battles in a way totally at odds with Delaware's
venerable policy of judicial restraint.
Supported by these rationales for rejecting plaintiffs' narrow reading of
Unocal, the Court believes that Time's board could rightly conclude that the
Paramount offer posed "other threats"4 " than inadequate value. Paradoxically,
the threats were that Time shareholders, acting out of "ignorance,. 7 "uncertainty,"4 and confusion, might tender their stock to Paramount and thereby
jeopardize, not their own well-being, but the corporate strategy of joining Time
41. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,938 at 95,210.
42. Id. at 95,209 (emphasis added).
43. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
44. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,938 at 95,210.

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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and Warner. In short, the risk was that the Paramount bid provided an
instrument by which shareholders themselves might undermine the interests of
the enterprise.
As the Court completes its opinion, it focuses in two ways, with even greater
precision, on the interests of the corporate enterprise. First, it rejects plaintiffs'
claims that the Time board had not made an "informed" 49 decision that
Paramount's offer was a threat to Time's corporate policy. The Court refers to
Chancellor Allen's finding that Time's board had spurned the offer because the
board specifically concluded that the bid did not "serve Time's objectives or meet
Time's needs." 5 No mention is made of shareholders. Thus, since Time was
under no obligation to negotiate with Paramount, its refusal to do so was not
uninformed. Second, in also rejecting the claim that Time's board had not acted
reasonably under the second prong of Unocal, the Court goes beyond its earlier
assertion that it was the Time enterprise and not Time shareholders that were
the proper focal point of attention to stress that the board of directors and not
shareholders govern the corporation and make its crucial policy decisions. That
duty, conferred by statute, may not be delegated to shareholders. Moreover, in
discharging that duty, directors (outside of the Revlon mode) are not obligated
to jettison plans for the corporate enterprise to procure a premium for shareholders. Here, the Court comes full circle to its earlier assertion that corporate
management's duty to oversee a company's business and affairs extends even to
the "selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate goals." '5 ' A clearer
declaration of management's continuing central role in formulating and implementing corporate policy, even in the face of outside challenge via the capital
markets, would be hard to find.

TIME'S UNARTICULATED IMPLICATIONS
As with any judicial decision, one can read it narrowly or broadly. To read a
decision narrowly one emphasizes its facts and suggests how altered facts might
dictate a different outcome. To read a decision broadly, one stresses an enunciated principle that transcends the specific fact situation and potentially controls
the outcome in varied settings.
The Time decision is no different. Chancellor Allen himself points out that
the behavior in question-Time's proposed acquisition of Warner-is "perfectly conventional" business behavior and may be distinguished from a more
overt control mechanism like a decision not to redeem a poison pill.5 While
Chancellor Allen is a careful judge who seeks to limit his analysis to the case
before him, we think neither he nor the judges on the Supreme Court can so
easily contain the larger thrust of the decision. We explore three ways in which
49. The emphasis on the requirement that corporate directors' decisions be "informed" derives
from Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
50. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,938 at 95,210 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 95,211.
52. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 at 93,284 n.22.
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the reasoning that underlies Time destabilizes-and therefore leaves unsettled
-important elements of preTime corporate law.

Extending Time to the Poison Pill Redemption Context
As noted above, one way to limit the reach of Time is to differentiate overt
control maintenance mechanisms from more "conventional" business conduct.
Doing so enables one to explain why shareholders in Interco and Pillsbury were
allowed to choose between financial alternatives while those in Time were not.
In retrospect, one can say that the boards of Interco and Pillsbury made a
strategic mistake in trying to fight the fire of a hostile bid with the fire of a
restructuring alternative because, in so doing, they unavoidably invoked the
norm of shareholder welfare. This norm has two dimensions in the takeover
context. The first dimension is the orthodox, largely implicit notion that the
ultimate purpose of corporate endeavor is maximization of shareholder wealth.
In arguing that the company-sponsored restructurings were financially superior
to the hostile bids, the Interco and Pillsbury boards tacitly acknowledged that
immediate shareholder wealth enhancement was the relevant benchmark by
which their behavior should be evaluated. Having done so, it should not have
been a great surprise that the Chancery Court applied the second dimension of
shareholder primacy-ultimate say in decisions about the disposition of stockwith considerable zeal in assessing target board behavior. The result in each
case was an order that the poison pills be redeemed so that shareholders could
elect between the two options.5"
Management's behavior in Interco and Pillsbury thus can be viewed as quite
different from "just saying no" to a hostile bid and steadfastly refusing to
redeem a pill for reasons unrelated to shareholder welfare. Such reasons might
include concern about the proposed takeover's harmful impact on nonshareholder constituencies, a factor explicitly reiterated by the Supreme Court
in Time as forming a part of the Unocal reasonableness test, or the larger
enterprise considerations exemplified by Chancellor Allen's and the Supreme
Court's repeated references to "Time Culture."54 After the Time decision,
however, one might sensibly ask why target boards, in the same position as the
Interco and Pillsbury boards, could not simply decline to develop a restructuring
alternative and refuse to redeem their pills by asserting one of two things. First,
subscribing to the benchmark of shareholder wealth, management might contend that its assessment of the long-term value of the target company exceeds the
short-term break-up value and that its determination is controlling. The Supreme Court's Time opinion is adamant that management, not shareholders,
plays the pivotal decisionmaking role in corporate affairs and thus supports this
53. Our analysis leads to a different assessment of Interco and Pillsbury than the criticism
leveled at those decisions by the Supreme Court in Time. We lay the "blame," if you will, for the
outcome of those cases at the hands of target management, not the Chancery Court.
54. For a discussion of Time that focuses on the value placed on preservation of "Time Culture"
as indicative of the relevance of public interest considerations as a justification for antitakeover

measures, see Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L.J. (forthcoming).
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position. Alternatively, by tempering strict shareholder primacy, management
might assert that shareholders simply have no right to immediate premiums
even if management agrees that the longer term share value may be less than the
bidder's offering price. Here, the claim by management is not simply that it,
rather than the shareholders, has the decisive takeover voice as a matter of
process. It goes further and contends that, as a substantive matter, shareholder
well-being might yield to nonshareholder concerns 5 or to enterprise considerations such as preservation of "Time Culture."
The latter claim is less orthodox than the former, but it seems no less
plausible a reading of Time, especially since the Supreme Court treated the
objective of immediate shareholder wealth as seemingly limited to the special
case of Revlon. Both arguments lead to a preference for management's over
shareholders' voice. If, as the Time decision makes clear, shareholders have no
''say" on whether a target company should make an acquisition-the upshot of
which is to preclude an opportunity to tender their stock-why must they have
"say" on management's refusal to redeem a pill where the result is similarly to
preclude an opportunity to tender? Whether such refusal is premised on
managerial concern for "long run" shareholder welfare or on solicitude for
enterprise and nonshareholder considerations, the outcome is the same: shareholders have no legitimate complaint if management drives a bidder away by
56
refusing to redeem the pill.
There is little doubt that yet another case challenging a target board's refusal
to redeem a poison pill will arise in Delaware. If the target company board
refuses to develop a financial alternative to the hostile bid, then the Delaware
courts must state why that board's behavior is improper. Given the reasoning of
Time and its assertion that a target company board is free to favor articulable
longterm financial goals and preservation of the corporate enterprise over
shorter term shareholder wealth, the judiciary will be hard pressed to distinguish "conventional" business behavior from more overt defensive behavior
directed toward the same objectives.

Marginalizing Revlon
A second question that needs rethinking in the wake of Time is the meaning
and continued viability of Revlon. As indicated above, the Supreme Court's
Time opinion followed Chancellor Allen's lead in Interco and Time and read
55. Essentially this claim was made by the board of directors of Universal Foods when Amanda
Acquisition Corp. launched a hostile bid. While referring to this constituencies dimension as the
"corporate issue," the district court credited this concern in its Unocal review of the board's refusal
to redeem a poison pill. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 11989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,435 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 18, 1989), affd on other grounds, 877
F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989). Wisconsin, however, unlike
Delaware, has a statute explicitly authorizing director consideration of nonshareholder interests. See
infra note 62.

56. This may be the point of the Supreme Court's apparent criticism of AC Acquisitions,
Interco, and Pillsbury. See Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

94,938 at 95,209-10.
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Revlon narrowly and as not representing any radical departure from earlier
Delaware law. Sometime in the near future it will be necessary to revisit Revlon
in order to rethink its underlying rationale. To put it bluntly, why, even if a
break-up of the target company is "inevitable," should target company directors
be transformed into auctioneers whose sole function is to garner top dollar for
shareholders?
In TW Services Inc. v. S. W. T.Acquisition Corp.,57 decided just four months
before his decision in Time, Chancellor Allen appeared to anticipate this
challenge to Revlon. In TW Services he sought to preserve a role for Revlon by
contending that because there is no long run for shareholders once the target
company is in the Revlon mode, it does not matter to them "that a buyer who
will pay more cash plans to subject the corporation to a risky level of debt, or
that a buyer who offers less cash will be a more generous employer for whom
labor peace is more likely." ' Here Chancellor Allen took up the question of
how the corporate "enterprise" and various nonshareholder interests such as
employees fit into the matrix of considerations that target company directors can
draw on in formulating takeover strategy. But Chancellor Allen's somewhat
cavalier assertions on this question only express the conflict between shareholders and other interests; they do not resolve that conflict. Of course shareholders
don't care about nonshareholders or the long run once a corporation is in the
Revlon mode-they expect to be gone in the near future. Yet, Chancellor Allen
himself recognized in Interco and TW Services that corporate law is filled with
normative preferences, 5" and in Time both he and the Supreme Court appreciate that shareholder desires for current wealth are subordinated to other
considerations when the corporation is outside the Revlon mode. Why does
freedom to prefer other interests become illicit once in the Revlon mode? By
endorsing Revlon, even in its modest postTime form, Chancellor Allen in effect
says that, in one set of cases (Revlon, Interco, and Pillsbury) he prefers the norm
of shareholder primacy-whether in its substantive wealth maximization dimension or its procedural choice dimension-over competing values like labor
security and minimal indebtedness, while in others (such as Time) he does not.
Nowhere, however, has either he or the Supreme Court stated why, or identified
a more elemental and authoritative principle that differentiates those two
categories. Underlying normative preference remains, unarticulated and unjustified.
To suggest a wholesale revisiting of Revlon thus is to suggest that shareholder
primacy is no less subject to subordination within the Revlon mode than it is
without. For corporate law, of course, that borders on heresy. Shareholders have
been presumed to be what the game is all about, even if only over the usefully
vague long run. Yet Time's collaring of shareholder primacy invites us to
explore whether such a conceptualization of corporate activity remains useful
and viable today, whether based on traditional property law or newly-emerging
57. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
58. Id. at 92,179.
59. Id. at 92,180 n.14; Interco, 551 A.2d at 799-800.

94,334 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).

HeinOnline -- 45 Bus. Law. 2118 1989-1990

The Case Beyond Time

2119

contractual grounds;"0 or whether an altogether new and richer framework is
needed to account for the myriad demands placed on modern public corporations. Less ambitiously, allegiance to the conventional norm of shareholder
primacy can be preserved by reading Time's emphasis on managerial prerogative to imply that, when placed in the Revlon mode, the target company board
can seek a resolution that harmonizes shareholder wealth desires with sensitivity to nonshareholder claims on corporate endeavor. No one disputes that
management can take account of those considerations outside the takeover
context in a way that "costs" shareholders.6 ' Doing so once in the Revlon
posture is not necessarily inappropriate, even if it likewise "costs" shareholders.
Indeed, in bringing Revlon under the analytical framework of Unocal, the
Supreme Court in Time seems implicitly to sanction director consideration of
the nonshareholder interests it listed in Unocal. The result would be that
shareholders may depart the corporation via a Revlon auction but only with a
price per share equivalent to that obtainable, in management's judgment, over
the "long run" to which they usually are remitted when the enterprise is to
remain intact.
One might respond that such an approach would drain Revlon of its significance, but there are several reasons to believe that Revlon's days may be
numbered anyway. First, outside of Delaware, statutes broadly authorizing
directors to consider the impact of their actions on nonshareholder interests are
proliferating.62 Those statutes essentially overrule Revlon in the states where
they apply. For example, in breaking up a Pennsylvania corporation in response to a takeover bid-a situation where in Time the Supreme Court
indicated Revlon would clearly apply to a Delaware corporation-a board may

60. For a description of the contractual theory of the corporation, see Butler, The Contractual
Theory of the Corporation, 11 George Mason L. Rev. 99 (Summer 1989). For critiques of that
theory, see Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate
Law, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 865, 891-98 (1990); Bratton, The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A
Critical Appraisal, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 407 (1989).
61. For a recent example of how in a multi-bidder, but not overtly hostile, context directors can
and do consider nonshareholder interests in selling a company, see Garcia, Core States To Buy First
Pennsylvania, Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1989, at A45, col. 1. The board of directors of First
Pennsylvania Corp. rejected a $20.85 per share bid from Meridian Bank Corp. in favor of an
$18.75 bid from Core States Financial Corp. because the board of First Pennsylvania was convinced
that Core States would consolidate the operations of the two companies without massive employee
lay-offs. Even in the nonRevlon takeover context, nonshareholder constituencies are cited by target
boards as a basis for resisting bids, especially highly leveraged bids. See, e.g., Amanda Acquisition
Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 11989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,435 (E.D.
Wis. Mar. 18, 1989), affd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
367 (1989).
62. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.251, subdiv. 5 (West Supp. 1990); Ind. Code Ann. § 231-35-1 (West 1989 & Supp. 1989); Il1. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-A, § 716 (Supp. 1989); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.59 (D) (Baldwin Supp.
1986); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 8363(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-1202
(West Supp. 1989); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.305 (West Supp. 1989).

HeinOnline -- 45 Bus. Law. 2119 1989-1990

2120 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 45, August 1990
structure the sale 6in3 a way that takes into account more than short-term
shareholder wealth.
Second, in Revlon the Supreme Court stated that "concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriatewhen an auction among active bidders is in
progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate
enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder. '6 Yet, three years later, the
Supreme Court qualified the auctioneer's duties by introducing a proviso. The
Court stated that the "proper objective of Macmillan's fiduciaries was to obtain
the highest price reasonably available for the company, provided it was offered
by a reputable and responsible bidder. 6' 5 In a footnote, the Court lists a wide
variety of factors a target board may consider in evaluating a bid and the
bidder's responsibility."6 Among the factors cited are "the impact of both the bid
and the potential acquisition on other constituencies, provided that it bears some
reasonable relationship to general shareholder interests. '67 What "reasonable
relationship" and "general shareholder interests" are remains to be filled in.
The point here is that Time's implicit challenge to Revlon was already inaugurated in Macmillan, with its renewed suggestion that target company boards
acting as auctioneers may recognize the interests of nonshareholders even in
Delaware.
Third, should Time be interpreted to empower management to refuse redemption of poison pills or rescission of other defensive measures, as we
suggested above, it is likely that target boards will have little trouble steering
clear of the Revlon mode in the first place. Like so many hoary legal doctrines,
it will remain on the books, unused. In the burgeoning wake of Time and TW
Services, then, it is far from clear that Revlon's insistence on exclusive devotion
to immediate shareholder wealth is, if ever it was, still viable.

Revisiting Unocal
Once target management's behavior is challenged in court the critical threshold question is the level of judicial scrutiny to which the conduct will be
subjected. From the vantage point of target management, the best outcome is the
fairly lax review accorded by the traditional business judgment rule. Here the
inquiry essentially is: "did the Board reach [its] decision in good faith pursuit of
legitimate corporate interests, and did it do so advisedly?""1
Until 1985, conventional business judgment rule review prevailed in examining management's defensive behavior just as it did in examining management's
behavior outside the takeover context. Concerned about the risk that target
management's defensive behavior was tainted by self-interest, the Delaware
63. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 8363(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
64. Reuton, 506 A.2d at 182 (emphasis added).
65. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 (Del. 1989) (emphasis
added).
66. Id. at 1282 n.29.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. TW Services, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334 at 92,182.
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Supreme Court in Unocal advanced a modified and somewhat stricter level of
judicial review. Unocal promulgated the now familiar two-step inquiry in
which, first, target directors must prove the existence of reasonable grounds for
believing that a takeover endangers "corporate policy and effectiveness."69 This
burden is satisfied by showing "good faith and reasonable investigation .... 7o
Second, a defensive measure must be "reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
This entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its
effect on the corporate enterprise." 7 Only after both aspects of the analysis are
answered favorably does the adoption of a defensive measure receive the
deference of the business judgment rule.
Having played a central role in Delaware corporate law for five years now,
another significant postTime question concerns the continued vitality of the
Unocal standard. This may appear odd in light of the Supreme Court's effort to
firmly ground its analysis on Unocal, even to the point of drawing Revlon under
the Unocal mantle. Nonetheless, by emphasizing in Time the centrality of
management in the handling of corporate affairs, the Delaware judiciary may
be forced to conflate the distinction between friendly and hostile acquisitions.
With the loss of that distinction goes the accepted rationale for differing
standards of judicial review.
Recall a basic point. Outside the narrow Revlon mode, a target company
board is under no obligation to conduct an auction or even to negotiate with a
potential buyer. This is true whether the buyer seeks a friendly or hostile
acquisition, as Lewis v. Honeywell and other cases make quite clear.72 In
concluding that Honeywell shareholders did not state a claim upon which relief
could be granted because Honeywell's chairman had spurned an overture by
Sperry Rand, the Chancery Court stated that directors may "in a proper case
involving a valid exercise of their business judgment discretion, reject a takeover
proposal without further negotiation."" That traditional business judgment
review rather than the Unocal standard is appropriate in examining a company's refusal to negotiate was reiterated by Chancellor Allen in TW Services,
where the more conventional standard was applied in assessing a board's refusal
to negotiate with a hostile bidder who insisted on a board's assent to a merger
agreement." In light of this uncontroversial principle, shouldn't the refusal of
Time's board of directors to negotiate with Paramount similarly have been

69. 493 A.2d at 955.
70. Id. (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964)).
71. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
72. Lewis v. Honeywell Inc., [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,565
(Del. Ch. July 28, 1987). In Time, the Supreme Court states that "Time's board was under no duty
to negotiate with Paramount. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953-55; see also Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1285
n.35." Time, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,938 at 95,210-11.
73. Honeywell, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,565 at 97,534.
74. TW Services, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334 at 92,182. Chancellor Allen stated that

"Insofar as ... [a bidder makes] a proposal to negotiate a merger, I understand the law to permit
the board to decline it ... ." Id.
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reviewed under traditional business judgment standards rather than the modified Unocal analysis?
Had Time's board of directors merely refused to negotiate with Paramount
and were that refusal itself the behavior challenged in court, then the answer
clearly is "yes." The Time board did more than refuse to negotiate, however. It
also proposed to purchase Warner. But does that wrinkle really matter if
corporate acquisitions of stock are committed to the discretion and judgment of a
board of directors, with governing statutes denying shareholders any role?
Chancellor Allen insists, and the Supreme Court wholeheartedly agrees, that
Unocal applies in Time because the purchase of Warner was "defensive in
character." 75 Thus, he believes that the "risks that Unocal was shaped to protect
against are equally present . "..."76
Simply asserting that doesn't make it so,
however. Nothing but the chronology of Paramount's bid and the change in the
Warner acquisition from a merger to a stock purchase made it "reactive." As to
the managerial self-interest that forms the central concern of Unocal, that
motivation is as likely to exist in friendly acquisitions and in stubborn refusals
to negotiate with hostile bidders as in defensive measures taken in "reaction" to
hostile bids. Yet the possibility of self-interest in the former contexts does not
compel a higher standard of review.
Perhaps a truer test of Unocal's viability will arise in a case that involves
managerial behavior less "conventional" than the purchase of a businessbehavior such as adoption and subsequent refusal to redeem a poison pill plan.
Such a case will differ from Time because in Time the board stayed within its
"corporate" domain, proposing an action that traditionally falls to management.
In intervening in the tender offer process by deploying a poison pill, however, a
target board less clearly advances a "corporate" objective than seems to meddle
in a "shareholder" matter. Indeed, Chancellor Allen discussed the anomalous
treatment of mergers and tender offers under modern corporate law in the TW
Services opinion. He recognized that, although both friendly mergers and hostile
takeovers are alternative routes to the same destination (control over corporate
assets), under current corporate statutes directors play a critical role in mergers
but no explicit role in tender offers, which are assumed to be pure stock
disposition matters. Poison pill plans, much like contemporary antitakeover
statutes, are essentially attempts to fill this statutory "gap" and afford management some "say" in the resolution of takeover contests. Sanction for this move
can be found in Unocal itself where the Supreme Court rejected the argument
that management must remain passive in responding to hostile bids.77
75. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 94,514 at 93,282; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,938 at 95,209.
76. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 at 93,282.
77. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 n.10. In TWServices, Chancellor Allen found support for applying
Unocal analysis to a target board's pill redemption decision in the case of Moran v. Household Int'l,
500 A.2d 1346 (1985). He noted that the Supreme Court in Moran cited the Unocal case after
stating that a board's action on the pill redemption question would be reviewed in accordance with
the basic fundamental duties owed by directors to the corporation and its stockholders. He went on
to say that he has "understood that citation to mean that a decision not to redeem a pill in the face of
a hostile tender offer is a defensive step that has to be 'reasonable in relation to the threat posed' by

HeinOnline -- 45 Bus. Law. 2122 1989-1990

The Case Beyond Time

2123

Chancellor Allen's distinction in TW Services between mergers and tender
offers appears to drive both his and the Supreme Court's conclusion in the later
Time decision. That is, since Paramount did in fact launch a hostile takeover
bid, not simply an overture directed to management to negotiate a merger or
acquisition, that alone appears to be sufficient to trigger Unocal. We demur, at
least, to that rationale. After all, outside the special Revlon mode, a target
company board can, in advancing the best interests of the corporation, respond
to an acquisition effort by declining to do anything and still receive business
judgment review of its conduct, regardless of the self-interest presumed by
Unocal. Similarly, in advancing the best interests of the corporation, why should
a board of directors facing a hostile bid not be free to take less passive, more
affirmative action, such as implementing and refusing to redeem a poison pill,
and still have its behavior scrutinized under traditional business judgment
78
review standards?
At bottom, there must be some nagging judicial doubt about the latter course
of behavior. But on what basis? Certainly not the managerial self-interest
thought to inhere in seeking to preserve the corporate enterprise and continue

corporate policy. That abounds in other contexts as well. Perhaps it is the
drastic interference with shareholder ability to alienate stock, an ability that

smacks of property rights. That "right," however, exists in unimpaired form
only if the law says it does. It occupies no special status aloof from other claims,
but, as with all manner of property, is hemmed in with whatever restrictions are
thought necessary for the public good. Moreover, that unfettered shareholder

claim is the very claim the Supreme Court rejected in Time when, in approving
Time's actions under Unocal analysis, it said that the board has no obligation
either to afford shareholders an opportunity to tender for premiums or to
operate the corporation so as to maximize short-term wealth. The end result in

Time is that the law declares that shareholders have no right, either as a matter
of corporate law or property law, to vote "yes" on the Paramount offer by
tendering their stock. A board of directors can effectively short-circuit the power

to sell.
such offer." TWServices, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (C('H) 94,334 at 92,182. That reference to Unocal in
the Moran decision, coming as a cryptic dictum only a short time after the Unocal standard was first
articulated, is a very thin reed upon which to base such a significant conclusion. See Amanda
Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,435 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 18, 1989) (analyzing target board refusal to redeem poison pill under
Unocal standard), affid on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367

(1989). Compare Ohio Rev. Code § 1701.59(C) (1988) (adopting clear and convincing standard for
reviewing claims that directors violated duties).
78. See In re DeSoto, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,964
(Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1990) (denying bidder request for order compelling redemption of poison pill
where target management made no effort to procure higher offer but warning target board to
maximize share value or face order for redemption). In light of the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Time, albeit not a poison pill case, the insistence of cases like DeSoto on using pills only as "gavels"
to run auctions and maximize share values rather than to preserve enterprises intact needs
rethinking.
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The fact that the outcome in Time was reached via the Unocal route or that
the target board arranged an acquisition rather than refusing to redeem a poison
pill is of no consequence. In fact, the real irony of Chancellor Allen's Unocal
analysis in Time is that it looks very much like vintage business judgment
review until the very end when he summarily concludes that the Warner
acquisition was "reasonable" under Unocal's second prong because it didn't
"legally preclude the successful prosecution of a hostile tender offer." 7 Thus,
while allowing target company management to place enormous (and potentially
insurmountable) barriers in the path of Paramount and hostile bidders in
general, the Delaware judiciary apparently wants to preserve the possibility
that companies can be acquired against the wishes of management. The judges
achieve this larger policy objective by purporting to acknowledge the continued
vitality of Unocal and its concerns about management self-interest. The very
logic and rhetoric of Time belie that acknowledgement, however, and lead us to
question what role Unocal can continue to play in the future.
If Unocal is to survive, its retention will not be a matter of logic-any more
than Revlon's will be. Instead, clinging to Unocal and Revlon will represent a
confession that, after five years of experience with Unocal review of management behavior in corporate takeovers, the Delaware judiciary still remains
uncertain about what to make of these transactions or how it should evaluate
management's reactions to them. Indeed, how can one read Delaware's takeover
decisions of the past few years and see anything but a gallant but still incomplete struggle to come to grips with the larger takeover phenomenon. Thus,
while in result Time represents a swing back towards empowering management
to protect the corporate enterprise, an unwillingness to jettison the role of
takeovers as important accountability instruments in corporate governance is
likely to remain. As their advocates have insisted, hostile takeovers are the
ultimate capital market check on the deficiencies of the traditional corporate
governance scheme. The central question in Delaware's corporate law today is
the extent to which the judiciary will sanction management's strategy of
transforming hostile takeovers from national securities market phenomena into
"corporate" matters to be evaluated under the generous protection Delaware
accords to management via the business judgment rule.

CONCLUSION
Unable yet to opt decisively for a solution that subjects shareholder welfare or
the fate of the corporate enterprise entirely to management's ambivalent and
loose fiduciary obligation (although in Time it comes quite close), and also
refusing to extend the shareholder centered thrust of Revlon and Interco, in this
still unfolding saga the Delaware judiciary purports to choose a middle course,
clinging to Unocal and Revlon, however questionable the courts' rationale may
79. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 at 93,284. The Supreme Court affirmed Chancellor
Allen's ruling on this point as "clearly supported by the record." Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,938
at 95,211.
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be. The logic of Time seems to imply the coming demise of Unocal and calls into
question the normative basis of Revlon. At the same time, Time implicitly
insists on the continued vitality of those decisions if for no other reason than that
Unocal's somewhat heightened standard of review and Revlon's auction mandate assure continuing judicial participation in monitoring an enormously
important social phenomenon. Despite that insistence, we suspect that the
Delaware judiciary will soon be called upon to decide the fate of Unocal review,
and also to articulate more clearly the meaning of Revlon. As it confronts those
challenges, it must ground Unocal on something more substantial than everpresent managerial self-interest. The judiciary must reconcile two deeplyimbedded principles that have come to symbolize the two poles in the larger
takeover debate: shareholder control over stock disposition matters and management control over corporate affairs. Inevitably, one must yield. It must also
explain the justification for Revlon's asserted preference for shareholders, an
assertion that grows increasingly puzzling in the wake of Time. Here a different
choice must be made: shareholder welfare versus broader enterprise considerations as the central principle of corporate law. Again, the tension demands
resolution.
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